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Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell  
& Hippel LLP 
One Penn Center, 19th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 Counsel for Appellee 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
McKee, Chief Judge. 
 Aliya Davis (“Davis”) appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in 
the defendants‟ favor in her suit against Davis Auto, Inc. (“Davis Auto”) and Tri-State 
Lending, LLC (“Tri-State”), in which Davis alleged her termination from her job at Davis 
Auto was motivated by unlawful retaliation in violation of  the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s judgment. 
I. 
 Since we write primarily for the parties, it is unnecessary to set forth the factual or 
procedural history of this case except to the extent it is helpful to our discussion. 
 Davis Auto and Tri-State are family-run businesses located in Pennsylvania.  
During the relevant time period, Davis Auto owned and operated two used automobile 
dealerships in Philadelphia and Levittown.  Joseph M. Davis, Jr. (“Davis, Jr.”) and 
Joseph M. Davis, Sr. (“Davis, Sr.”) served as Davis Auto‟s President and Vice-President, 
respectively.  Father and son also served as the sole members of Tri-State, a separate 
company that functioned as Davis Auto‟s controller.  William Bach (“Bach”), Davis, 
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Sr.‟s son-in-law and Davis, Jr.‟s brother-in-law, managed Tri-State‟s daily operations.  
J.A. 52-53, 182. 
 Davis, who is not related to the defendants, worked at Davis Auto and Tri-State in 
varied clerical capacities from June 2006 through October 2008.  During this time, Davis 
suffered from several ailments including anxiety, asthma, and a thyroid disorder.  
J.A. 436-38.  In a meeting with her employers on July 7, 2008, Davis informed the 
defendants that she might have cancer and added that she would likely need time off 
work to take care of her medical hardships and treatments.  J.A. 380, 476. 
Following the July 7, 2008 meeting, Davis worked for the defendants for 
approximately three months.  Davis‟s employment came to an end on October 15, 2008, 
when Davis, Jr. notified her that she was being laid off.  J.A. 379. 
 After exhausting administrative remedies, Davis filed suit alleging unlawful 
discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (“PHRA”).  Thereafter, the District Court granted the defendants‟ request 
for summary judgment.  See Davis v. Davis Auto, 2011 WL 5902220 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 
2011). The District Court held that Davis could not establish a prima facie claim because 
she could not show that she was “substantially limited” in a major life activity nor 
demonstrate that her employers perceived her as disabled.  Id. at *6-9.  The District Court 
also concluded that Davis could not make out a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation 
because she could not establish a causal connection between her alleged protected 
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activity and the defendants‟ decision to terminate her employment.  This appeal 
followed.1 
II. 
 Our review of a district court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Turner v. 
Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006).  “„When reviewing a district 
court‟s summary judgment decision in an ADA case, we . . . apply[] the same standard as 
the district court.‟”  Hip Heightened Indep. & Prog., Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 
693 F.3d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 
177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Summary judgment is proper only where no genuine issue as to 
any material fact exists such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Davis must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she undertook some protected activity, 
(2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there exists a causal 
connection between the two.  Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir. 
1997).   If Davis establishes a prima facie claim, “„the burden shifts to the employer to 
advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its adverse employment action.‟”  
Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500).  If the employer successfully meets this burden of production, 
Davis has to show that the otherwise legitimate reasons advanced by her employer  are 
actually a pretext to mask a retaliatory animus.  See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 501. 
                                              
1 Davis withdrew her PHRA claim against the defendants before the District Court 
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The District Court assumed that Davis engaged in protected conduct when she 
informed her employers about the possibility that she had cancer and requested an 
accommodation in the form of an undetermined amount of time off from work in the July 
7, 2008 meeting.  Because the parties do not contest this issue, we will afford Davis the 
benefit of the same presumption.  It is also clear that Davis was subject to an adverse 
employment action when the defendants terminated her on October 15, 2008.  See 
Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]ermination clearly fulfills the second prong of the prima facie case for a retaliation 
claim.”). 
The parties expend a substantial portion of their briefs discussing whether or not 
the District Court correctly concluded that Davis could not establish a prima facie causal 
connection between her asserted protected activity and the defendants‟ decision to 
terminate her employment.  However, we need not address that issue because it is clear 
on this record that Davis cannot meet her ultimate burden of showing that the defendants‟ 
stated legitimate reason for her termination masked retaliatory motives.2 
                                              
2 Davis‟s final argument attacks the defendants‟ proffered legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for her termination.  Davis argues that the defendants should be 
estopped from claiming that she was laid off due to economic or performance-related 
issues because in a deposition submitted to Pennsylvania‟s Department of Labor, Bach 
stated that the reason for Davis‟s separation from employment was “lack of work.”  
Inconsistent statements, however, “are not sanctionable unless a litigant has taken one or 
both positions „in bad faith – i.e., with intent to play fast and loose with the court.‟”  
Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Savs. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 781-82 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 
(3d Cir. 1996)).  We do not find the requisite bad faith element here. 
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Specifically, the defendants assert that declining business and corresponding 
financial difficulties led them to decide to reduce personnel.  Consistent with this 
business decision, the defendants claim that Davis was selected for termination due to a 
documented history of shortcomings in the areas of attendance and performance.  J.A. 
900-02. 
 Davis underscores alleged inconsistencies in the witnesses‟ testimony, such as 
Bach‟s failure to recall whether it was Davis, Jr. or Davis, Sr. who first proposed her 
termination.  However, even reading any such inconsistencies in the light most favorable 
to Davis, other compelling evidence in the record undercuts any charge of pretext.3  Most 
importantly, Davis discounts the undisputed fact that, once informed of the possibility 
that Davis could have cancer on July 7, 2008, the defendants‟ immediate response was to 
suggest that she join the companies‟ medical insurance plan and to offer her a $3.00 
hourly raise.  J.A. 186.  Davis then continued to work for the defendants for 
approximately fourteen weeks before being laid off in October 2008 – a period during 
which she concedes the defendants underwent financial difficulties that led them to 
reduce overall costs.  J.A. 187.  Davis‟s attempt to claim retaliatory motives after the 
defendants tried to support her by offering her a medical insurance plan to cover any 
cancer treatments and an hourly raise is patently frivolous.  
                                              
3 Defendants argue that Davis‟s claim of pretext was waived because it was not timely 
asserted in the District Court.  However, since the record does not raise a genuine issue of 
fact regarding a pretextual motive, we reject that argument on its merits.  
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 Moreover, the defendants‟ cost reduction efforts (and the effect these had on 
personnel) are well-documented in the record.4  Based on these facts, we do not believe a 
reasonable juror could find that the defendants‟ decision to terminate Davis was 
motivated in whole or in part by her request for time off to tend to her ailments.5 
III. 
In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court‟s November 22, 2011 order. 
COSTS TAXED AGAINST APPELLANT. 
                                              
4 For example, at least 8 of the 21 employees in the defendants‟ combined 2008 
payroll list were laid off between September and December of that year.  J.A. 81-86.  In 
December 2008, the defendants also shuttered Davis Auto‟s location in Levittown, 
Pennsylvania.  J.A. 52, 182. 
 
5 Contrary to Davis‟s argument, the fact that the defendants reassigned Davis‟s job 
functions to an employee upon her departure does not, by itself, suggest pretext, nor does 
it necessarily contradict the defendants‟ claim that her termination was the result of the 
companies‟ financial difficulty.  This court has recognized that an employer‟s decision to 
reassign work duties to a higher-paid incumbent employee does not betray a causal link 
between a plaintiff‟s protected activity and her termination unless “other evidence” 
renders the employer‟s asserted legitimate motive “inconsistent or incongruous.”  LeBoon 
v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 234 (3d Cir. 2007).  Here, we do not 
find other such evidence. 
 
